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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Campbell v. Gen. Dynamics Gov't Sys. Corp.*
I. INTRODUCTION
Does an email communication give an employee adequate notice of a
mandatory arbitration agreement, so that it is enforceable if the employee
should subsequently bring a federal discrimination claim? Can companies
take advantage of the informality, speed, and convenience of email when
communicating arbitration agreements to their employees? Does an email
even constitute a written agreement under the confines of the Federal
Arbitration Act? The case of Campbell v. General Dynamics Gov't Sys.
Corp. addresses the use of email technology in providing notice for
arbitration agreements.' The Campbell decision could have a lasting impact
on companies who use email to communicate new and binding policies to
their employees. After Campbell, employers will need to inform their
employees about company policies in a more effective and conspicuous
manner than mass email alone.
H. FACTS AND PROCEDURE
On April 30, 2001, General Dynamics 2 sent a mass email to its entire
work force regarding the implementation of a new dispute resolution policy
("the Policy"). 3 The email took the form of a single-spaced page-long letter,
addressed "Dear Fellow Employee," from the company president.4 The
introductory paragraphs were vague and innocuous,5 stating that General
Dynamics was "a leader in a very competitive marketplace" and that it was
committed to "open, forthright and honest communication," especially when
"addressing and resolving employee issues concerning legally protected
* Campbell v. Gen. Dynamics Gov't Sys. Corp., 407 F.3d 546 (1st Cir. 2005).
1 Id. The lower court opinion is Campbell v. Gen. Dynamics Gov't Sys. Corp., 321
F. Supp. 2d 142 (D. Mass. 2004).
2 General Dynamics is a company specializing in military and business technology,
including aerospace design, combat systems, information technology, and marine
systems. See General Dynamics, http://www.generaldynamics.com (last visited Feb. 21,
2006).
3 Campbell, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 144.
4Id.
51d.
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rights and matters." '6 The email explained further that the company had
developed a new policy to handle legal issues arising out of workplace
disputes. 7 The Policy itself was not contained in the email, but rather was
accessible through two hyperlinks8 at the bottom.9 The first hyperlink opened
a brochure, and the second opened an employee manual, both giving more
details about the Policy. 10 General Dynamics also posted the new Policy on
its company intranet. 11 The Policy was speedily enacted, becoming effective
and binding the day after the email was sent.12
The email referred to the actual policy in (what the district court
characterized as) "broad terms" with "a vague reference to the issues it
encompassed."' 13 The email did describe, however, the Policy's four-step
approach to dispute resolution, including the last step of "arbitration by a
qualified and independent arbitrator." 14 The email mentioned that the new
policy was an "essential element" of the "employment relationship." 15 The
Policy itself, which included a waiver of the employee's right to access a
judicial forum, was not further described in the email. 16
6 Campbell, 407 F.3d at 548.
7 Campbell, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 144.
8 A 'hyperlink,' or 'link' for short, is "a reference in a hypertext document to another
document or other resource," which "can be used to fetch the resources referenced" and
"can then be saved, viewed, or displayed as part of the referencing document." See
Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hyperlink (last visited Feb. 19, 2006).
9 Campbell, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 144.
10 Id.
I1 An intranet is a "local area network [a computer network covering a local area]
used internally in an organization to facilitate communication and access to information
that is sometimes access-restricted." See Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intranet;
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Localareanetwork (last visited Feb. 19, 2006).
12 Campbell, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 144.
13 Id. The company's email read, "We have developed the Dispute Resolution
Policy ('DRP') to address legal issues raised by either an employee or General Dynamics
Communication Systems." Id.
14 Campbell v. Gen. Dynamics Gov't Sys. Corp., 407 F.3d 546, 548 (1st Cir. 2005).
15 Id.
16 Id.
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There were two links in the email. 17 The first link contained a URL 18
labeled "Brochure." When an employee clicked on the link, a two-page
brochure about the Policy was opened. 19 The second page of this brochure
contained a statement that the Policy would encompass "employment
discrimination and harassment claims," followed by a list of examples which
included "disability," and that any employees who continued working after
the effective date of the Policy's adoption would be covered by its terms.20 In
a shaded box in the lower right-hand comer of the brochure's second page,
an assertion stated that this Policy was the "exclusive means of resolving
workplace disputes for legally protected rights," and that if a lawsuit were
filed by an employee, General Dynamics would reference the Policy and ask
the court for a dismissal.21 The second link in the email was labeled
"Handbook," and accessed a 26-page dispute resolution handbook containing
the Policy in its entirety.22 The handbook also contained a flow chart
illustration, forms for filing claims, and a list of questions and answers
regarding the Policy.23
Several months after emailing the Policy, General Dynamics fired an
employee named Roderick Campbell because he was continuously late or
absent for work.24 Campbell worked at General Dynamics as an at-will
employee, holding a full-time salaried position.25 He suffered from sleep
apnea,26 a medical condition involving nighttime breathing interruptions
17 Id.
18 The acronym 'URL' stands for 'Uniform Resource Locator.' A URL is a
standardized address name layout for resources on the Internet. See Wikipedia,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/URL (last visited Feb. 19, 2006). While the appellate court
entitles the URL "Brochure," the district court referred to it as "disputejresolution.htm."
It is possible that the web address was entitled Brochure as a link in the email, but this is
not accurately described as a URL.
19 Campbell, 407 F.3d at 548.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Campbell v. Gen. Dynamics Gov't Sys. Corp., 321 F. Supp. 2d 142, 145 (D.
Mass. 2004).
23 Campbell, 407 F.3d at 548.
24 Id. at 549.
25 Id. The appellate court has Campbell beginning employment at General Dynamics
on June 6, 2000, while the district court has Campbell working there from February 18,
2000. He was terminated on December 30, 2002.
26 Id.
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which can cause a person to be overly tired.27 Claiming that he was
discharged because of his medical condition, Campbell brought suit against
General Dynamics for disability discrimination 28 under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA)29 and Massachusetts state law. 30
General Dynamics removed Campbell's action to federal court.31 After
removing the claim, General Dynamics invoked the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA) 32 and moved to stay the federal court proceedings and compel
Campbell to arbitrate his claims in accordance with the Policy. 33 General
Dynamics argued that the company's Policy had been implemented while
Campbell was employed, that the Policy applied to Campbell's case, and that
27 For a brief overview of the medical condition of sleep apnea, see Breathing
Problems During Sleep, 285 JAMA 2936 (2001), available at http://jama.ama-
assn.org/cgi/reprint/285/22/2936. For a more technical description, see Sleep Apnea
Information and Resources, http://www.stanford.edu/-dement/apnea.html (last visited
Feb. 21, 2006).
28 Employees with sleep apnea have rarely been successful bringing ADA claims
against the employers who fired them. Usually summary judgment is rendered on behalf
of the employer. See, e.g., Brown v. Triboro Coach Corp., 153 F. Supp. 2d 172 (E.D.N.Y.
2001); Mont-Ros v. City of West Miami, 111 F. Supp. 2d 1338 (S.D. Fla. 2000); Taylor
v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Tex., Inc., 55 F. Supp. 2d 604 (N.D. Tex. 1999); Hill v.
Metro. Atlanta RTA, 77 F. Supp. 2d 1291 (N.D. Ga. 1999). Appeals from employees
with sleep apnea pursuing an ADA claim have been unsuccessful. See Silk v. City of
Chicago, 194 F.3d 788 (7th Cir. 1999); Cartwright v. Lockheed Martin Util. Servs., 40
Fed. Appx. 147 (6th Cir. 2002).
29 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000). The ADA is available online at
http://www.law.comell.edu/uscode/html/uscode42/ usc.sup014210126.html. See
also infra note 54. Sleep apnea has been a particularly controversial disability under the
ADA. See Kelly Cahill Timmons, Accommodating Misconduct Under The Americans
with Disabilities Act, 57 FLA. L. REv. 187, 259 (2005) (discussing Brohm v. JH Props.,
Inc., 947 F. Supp. 299, 300-01 (W.D. Ky. 1996), aft'd, 149 F.3d 517 (6th Cir. 1998), in
which an anesthesiologist with sleep apnea was discharged for falling asleep during
surgical procedures); William B. Lovett, Jr., Note, Supreme Court's Clarification of the
Effect of "Mitigating Measures" in Disability Determinations Muddies Disabilities
Waters: Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 21 Miss. C. L. REv. 153, 168-69 (discussing
Taylor v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Texas, 55 F. Supp. 2d 604, 611 (N.D. Tex.
1999), in which a sales instructor whose sleep apnea was relieved by a medical device
was not considered disabled within the meaning of the ADA).
30 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 15 1B, § 4 (2003). Campbell initially filed his complaint
with a state administrative agency, the Massachusetts Commission Against
Discrimination. He later withdrew that complaint and filed suit in Massachusetts state
court.
31 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367, 1441 (2000).
32 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16.
33 9 U.S.C. §§ 3,4.
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it required him to refer his claims to mandatory arbitration. 34 Campbell
claimed not to have read the Policy and had no memory of receiving the
email containing the policy.35 General Dynamics nevertheless endeavored to
hold Campbell to the allegedly unviewed agreement to bring all suits to
arbitration. 36 General Dynamics contended that the Policy forged an
enforceable agreement to arbitrate all employment-related claims, and that it
prevented Campbell from bringing his ADA claim in federal court because
arbitration was the exclusive means of resolution.37 Campbell responded
with two arguments: 1) that the Policy was unenforceable because the
company's email failed to give him adequate notice, and thus he was not
bound by it; and 2) that an email communication is not a writing, and thus
the Policy did not satisfy the "written provision" requirement of 9 U.S.C.
§ 2.38
The district court denied the defendant's motion to stay the proceedings
and compel arbitration.39 The court determined that the company's efforts to
notify the plaintiff about the Policy were insufficient to extinguish his right
to a judicial forum for his disability discrimination claims. 40 The court
focused on the characteristics of email as a form of notification and declared
that "a mass email message, without more, fails to constitute the minimal
level of notice required" to enforce an agreement to arbitrate ADA claims.4 1
The court concluded "that the notice was wanting" and that "enforcement of
the waiver would be inappropriate." 42 Because the court found that "General
Dynamics' efforts to notify its employees of the [Policy] so clearly fail
against Campbell's first argument," it did not address the second argument of
whether an electronic communication can constitute a written agreement
under the FAA.43
34 Campbell v. Gen. Dynamics Gov't Sys. Corp., 407 F.3d 546, 549 (1st Cir. 2005).
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 549.
39 Campbell v. Gen. Dynamics Gov't Sys. Corp., 321 F. Supp. 2d 142, 150 (D.
Mass. 2004). In a separate order, the court struck the related affirmative defense and
denied the plaintiff's request for sanctions.
40 Id. at 149.
41 Id.
42 Campbell, 407 F.3d at 547.
43 Campbell, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 145.
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General Dynamics appealed the denial of its motion to stay proceedings
and compel arbitration and the order striking its affirmative defense.44 The
appellate court45 affirmed the lower court's decision.46 The court held that
the mandatory arbitration agreement contained in the Policy that was linked
to the company's email was unenforceable. 47 This particular email
announcement was found to be insufficient for putting an employee on notice
that his right to access a judicial forum was extinguished.48 The court also
addressed Campbell's second argument and declared that an email can
satisfy the FAA's requirement for a written agreement because of the E-Sign
Act.4
9
11. THE COURT'S REASONING
A. The FAA and the ADA
After giving a brief history of the FAA and its interpretation by the
Supreme Court,50 the appellate court stated:
When a party relies on the FAA to assert a contractual right to arbitrate a
claim arising under a federal employment discrimination statute, the court
must undertake a supplemental inquiry... [which] ... grows out of the
principle that while federal statutory claims can come within an arbitration
44 Campbell, 407 F.3d at 550.
45 Because orders refusing stays and orders denying petitions to compel arbitration
(under section 3, see 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(A), and under section 4, see 9 U.S.C.
§ 16(a)(1)(B), respectively) are statutory exceptions to the final judgment rule created by
the FAA, the appellate court claimed jurisdiction to review the lower court's denial of the
company's motion to stay proceedings and compel arbitration. The court cited Marie v.
Allied Home Mortg. Corp., 402 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2005). However, the appellate court
stated that it did not have jurisdiction to review the district court's order striking the
company's affirmative defense, because such an order did not implicate the FAA under 9
U.S.C. § 16(a)(1) or (a)(3). Campbell, 407 F.3d at 547, n.3.
46 Campbell, 407 F.3d at 547 n.3.
4 7 Id. at 558.
48 Id.
49 See infra note 109.
50 The Campbell court's discussion included an overview of Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991); Allied-Bruce Terminex Cos. v.
Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995); AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S.
643 (1986); and Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
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agreement that is enforceable pursuant to the FAA, some federal statutory
claims may not be appropriate for arbitration. 5 1
This "supplemental inquiry focuses on whether the agreement to arbitrate
is enforceable with respect to the particular statutory claim at issue (here, the
plaintiff's ADA claim)," and the party resisting arbitration bears the burden
of showing "that Congress, in enacting a particular statute, intended to
preclude a waiver of a judicial forum for certain statutory claims." 52
Campbell's case was brought as an employment discrimination case
under the ADA.53 The ADA expressly encourages arbitration of disputes
under some circumstances involving disability discrimination. 54 The First
Circuit previously held that ADA claims were not beyond the FAA's reach in
51 Campbell, 407 F.3d at 552 (citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26).
52 Id.
53 The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) requires employers to make
reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise
qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless the
employer can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on
the operation of the employer's business. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000). The ADA
defines "disability" to include (1) a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (2) a record of such an
impairment; or (3) being regarded as having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)
(2000). A disabled individual is otherwise "qualified" if he or she, with or without
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment
position that such individual holds or desires, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2000). See generally
Miranda Oshige McGowan, Reconsidering the Americans with Disabilities Act, 35 GA. L.
REV. 27 (2000) (providing a general history, overview, and reconsideration of the ADA).
The author considers ADA to be "the culmination of the civil rights movement." Id. at
30.
54 "[W]here appropriate and to the extent authorized by law, the use of alternative
means of dispute resolution, including ... arbitration, is encouraged to resolve disputes
arising under this chapter." 42 U.S.C. § 12212 (2000). For a discussion of arbitration in
the context of the ADA, see Jeffrey P. Ferrier, ADA and ADR: Approaching an Adequate
Adjudicatory Allocation, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 1281, 1284 (1996) (endeavoring to answer
the question of "whether it is 'appropriate,' under the ADA, for ADR agreements to be a
disabled individual's sole remedy for alleged acts of discrimination."). For a critical view
of the use of arbitration under the ADA, see generally Wendy S. Tien, Note, Compulsory
Arbitration of ADA Claims: Disabling the Disabled, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1443 (1993)
(suggesting that a voluntary settlement, in which both parties consent to being bound
solely to arbitration, is the only valid use of arbitration for ADA claims). For an analysis
of mediation under the ADA, see Ann C. Hodges, Dispute Resolution under the
Americans with Disabilities Act: A Report to the Administrative Conference of the United
States, 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1007, 1053 (1996).
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the case of Bercovitch v. Baldwin Sch., Inc.55 While Bercovitch found "that
the ADA did not necessarily prohibit enforcement of a waiver of a right to a
judicial forum," it did not answer "whether agreements involving such
waivers are enforceable as long as they meet the requirements of the FAA,"
nor "whether [42 U.S.C.] section 12212 should be understood to impose a
further, independent limitation on the enforceability of such agreements. '56
The Campbell court cited Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp.,57
where
the Supreme Court gave force to the word "appropriate" in § 12212 by
finding that it would not be appropriate ... to enforce an agreement to
arbitrate employment discrimination claims, contained in a collective
bargaining pact, where a union's waiver of employee rights was not "clear
and unmistakable."5 8
But the Supreme Court "expressly declined to consider whether to extend
it to individual waivers and refrained from commenting on the meaning of
the word 'appropriate' in the latter context."'59
55 133 F.3d 141, 149-50 (lst Cir. 1998).
56 Campbell, 407 F.3d at 553 (1st Cir. 2005).
57 525 U.S. 70 (1998).
58 Campbell, 407 F.3d at 553 (citations omitted). "Our conclusion that a union
waiver of employee rights to a federal judicial forum for employment discrimination
claims must be clear and unmistakable means that, absent a clear waiver, it is not
'appropriate,' within the meaning of this provision of the ADA, to find an agreement to
arbitrate." Wright, 525 U.S. at 82 n.2. For discussions of the Supreme Court's various
rulings interpreting the ADA, see generally Ronald Turner, The Americans with
Disabilities Act and the Workplace: A Study of the Supreme Court's Disabling Choices
and Decisions, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 379 (2004). Turner argues that
the Court's interpretations of the ADA's provisions and its rulings have provided
rough sledding for plaintiffs, have evinced a narrow conception of disability and a
resulting reduction in the scope of federal disabilities discrimination law, and have
not provided employees with the protection anticipated and desired by the law's
proponents.
Id. at 382. See also Bonnie Poitras Tucker, The Supreme Court's Definition of Disability
Under the ADA: A Return to the Dark Ages, 52 ALA. L. REV. 321 (2000) (focusing on
three decisions of the Court which "drastically curtailed the number of persons who may
seek protection from discrimination on the basis of disability under the ADA and
seriously limited the circumstances under which even individuals with obvious
disabilities may seek protection from discrimination").
59 Campbell, 407 F.3d at 553 (citing Wright, 525 U.S. at 82 n.2).
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B. Appropriateness under Rosenberg
In order to prevail, General Dynamics needed to successfully establish
two things: 1) "that the provision for mandatory arbitration [was] part of a
valid contract within the purview of the FAA," and 2) that "the enforcement
of the arbitration provision would be appropriate under the ADA." 60 The
First Circuit called these "independent, yet overlapping, issues." 61 In
addressing whether enforcement of the arbitration agreement was appropriate
in Campbell, the court relied on Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc.6 2 Rosenberg addressed the effect of language in the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 that was identical to the language found in the ADA,
regarding the enforceability of arbitration agreements involving employment
discrimination claims. 63 The Rosenberg court focused on Congress's
assertion that agreements to arbitrate should be enforced only when it was
"appropriate" to do so,64 and interpreted "appropriate" as "prompting an
additional, independent inquiry into the appropriateness of restricting access
to a judicial forum or of compelling arbitration in a particular federal
statutory case." 65 The Campbell court reasoned that the interpretation of the
term "appropriate" in Rosenberg was fully applicable in Campbell, because
the statute in Rosenberg66 contained language which "mirror[ed] the
language found in the ADA," and the statute applied directly to the ADA.67
The Campbell court noted, however, that "[t]he appropriateness analysis is
60 Id. at 554-55.
61 Id. at 555.
62 170 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1999). See generally Miriam A. Cherry, Case Comment, A
Negotiation Analysis of Mandatory Arbitration Contracts, 4 HARv. NEGOT. L. REv. 269
(1999) (summarizing the facts and legal issues involved in the Rosenberg case). Judge
Nancy Gertner, the district court judge who decided Campbell, also wrote the lower
court's decision in Rosenberg, which was affirmed by the appellate court. See Rosenberg
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 995 F. Supp. 190 (D. Mass. 1998).
63 See Rosenberg, 170 F.3d at 18-19.
64 Campbell, 407 F.3d at 553 (citing Rosenberg, 170 F.3d at 19-21).
65 Id. at 553-54.
66 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 118, 105 Stat. 1071, 1081
(1991). For an overview of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, see generally Symposium, The
Civil Rights Act of 1991, 54 LA. L. REv. 1459 (1994) (providing a myriad of perspectives
on the Act, its effectiveness, and its legacy).
67 Campbell, 407 F.3d at 553 n.4.
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case-specific," and that other circuits had disagreed with Rosenberg's
interpretation of "appropriate. 68
The Rosenberg decision cited Wright v. Universal Maritime Service
Corp.,69 which held that a waiver of a judicial forum must be "clear and
unmistakable" 70 to be enforceable, and that "there must be some minimal
level of notice to the employee that statutory claims are subject to
arbitration," 71 although a lesser standard than "clear and unmistakable"
applies in the context of private agreements.72 Though the Rosenberg
decision dealt with the 1991 Civil Rights Act, the decision explicitly noted
that the ADA used similar language. The First Circuit reiterated "Congress's
concern that agreements to arbitrate employment discrimination claims
should be enforced only where 'appropriate,"' noting that this concern was
"not expressed in the FAA or at common law." 73
In applying Rosenberg's holding74 that "the employer must afford 'some
minimal level of notice to the employee that statutory claims are subject to
arbitration' in order for arbitration to be deemed appropriate," 75 the
Campbell court analyzed whether the email from General Dynamics
68 Id. at 554 (citing Haskins v. Prudential Ins. Co., 230 F.3d 231, 241 (6th Cir. 2000)
(finding it "unwise to require a heightened standard that arbitration be 'appropriate'
without a clear Congressional requirement to do so, especially in light of the strong
federal policy favoring arbitration"); Seus v. John Nuveen & Co., 146 F.3d 175, 183 (3d
Cir. 1998) (reading the clause "where appropriate and to the extent authorized by law" as
referring to the FAA); Gold v. Deutsche Aktiengesellschaft, 365 F.3d 144, 149 (2d Cir.
2004) (declining to adopt Rosenberg's interpretation of "appropriate" in a securities
employment case involving an arbitration agreement)). One contrary example cited was
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1305 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that the word
"appropriate" tends to limit the enforcement of arbitration provisions to situations in
which the plaintiff "has knowingly agreed to submit such disputes to arbitration").
69 525 U.S. 70 (1998). See generally Jacob E. Tyler, Case Comment, Mandatory
Arbitration of Discrimination Claims under Collective Bargaining Agreements: The
Effect of Wright, 4 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 253 (1999) (assessing the impact of the Wright
decision).
70 Wright, 525 U.S. at 80.
71 Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1, 21 (1st
Cir. 1999).
72 Id.
73 Id. at 19.
74 One judge on the First Circuit, J. Lipez, concurred solely for the sake of pointing
out the 'exemplary' application of Rosenberg to Campbell by Judge Selya, and to affirm
support for the Rosenberg precedent. Campbell v. Gen. Dynamics Gov't Sys. Corp., 407
F.3d 546, 559 (1st Cir. 2005) (Lipez, J., concurring).
75 Campbell, 407 F.3d at 554 (citing Rosenberg, 170 F.3d at 21).
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provided this minimal level of notice to Roderick Campbell. The court stated
that "[iln many cases, an employer will be able to satisfy this relatively light
burden by producing evidence demonstrating that the employee had actual
notice of the agreement. '76 In determining whether there was sufficiency of
notice, the court asked whether the hyperlinked email "would have provided
a reasonably prudent employee notice of the waiver."77 The court relied on
the objective standard enunciated in Rosenberg,78 which takes into
consideration factors such as "the method of communication, the workplace
context, and the content of the communication." 79 According to the court, the
General Dynamics Company did not meet that burden because they "did not
bother to elicit from any employee" either 1) "an affirmation that he or she
had read the email (much less the Policy)," or 2) an affirmation of awareness
"that arriving for work the next morning would constitute binding acceptance
of a new contractual term replacing court access with arbitration."8 0
C. The Company Email and Notice
The Campbell court focused on the question of whether the
communication by email conveyed adequate notice of the mandatory
arbitration agreement. The court concluded that the email's text "did not
carry the burden of providing fair warning that showing up for work the next
day would result in a waiver of important rights." 81 The email failed to "state
directly that the Policy contained an arbitration agreement" and that this
agreement "was meant to effect a waiver of an employee's right to access a
76 Id. at 555. The court cited Gibson v. Neighborhood Health Clinics, Inc., 121 F.3d
1126, 1130 (7th Cir. 1997). For an overview of Gibson, see Franklin G. Snyder, The
Pernicious Effect of Employment Relationships in the Law of Contracts, 10 TEx.
WESLEYAN L. REv. 33, 60 (2003).
77 Campbell, 407 F.3d at 555.
78 Rosenberg, 170 F.3d at 21 n.17.
79 Campbell, 407 F.3d at 555. See generally Cherry, supra note 62. For a discussion
of the Rosenberg standard in the context of a circuit split regarding the proper standard
for determining waiver of a judicial forum in a pre-dispute arbitration agreement, see
Jonathan H. Peyton, Note, What Arbitration Clause?: The "Appropriate" Standard for
Measuring Notice of Binding Arbitration to an Employee, 36 SuFFOLK U. L. REv. 745,
752-56 (2003) (discussing Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299 (9"' Cir.
1994), Rosenberg, 170 F.3d 1, and Haskins v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 230 F.3d 231
(6th Cir. 2000)).
80 Campbell, 407 F.3d at 555.
81 Id. at 557.
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judicial forum."82 The email did not adequately portray the Policy's
contractual significance, and was not explicit enough to provide effective
notice. 83 The textual language of the email was far more casual in its
language and in its "tone and choice of phrase," than the language in the
Policy.84 "While the Policy itself spoke in clear, contractual language... the
email announcement descanted in an entirely different vocabulary,
downplaying the obligations set forth in the Policy. 85 The court further
emphasized that the
text of the e-mail did not state either that the Policy contained contractually
binding terms or that the employer would treat continued employment as an
acceptance of those terms ... [T]he e-mail's description of the four-step
dispute resolution procedure omitted the crucial fact that, as a matter of law,
the regimen would become an employee's exclusive remedy for
employment-related claims of virtually every kind and description.86
The email failed to specify that arbitration was mandatory.87 "[W]hile
the e-mail announcement communicated the notion that arbitration is a
kinder, gentler alternative to litigation and had the company's blessing, it did
not suggest that arbitration was to become mandatory and thereby extinguish
an employee's access to a judicial forum as a means for dispute resolution. 88
General Dynamics argued that the email was sufficient because it stated
that the Policy was "an essential element of [the] employment relationship,"
and because it requested the recipient to "review the enclosed materials
carefully." 89 The court replied that "[a]lthough these statements would
indicate to a reasonable person that the employer regarded the Policy as
important, they do not in and of themselves elucidate (or even intimate) the
imposition of a mandatory agreement to arbitrate." 90 The court continued,
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 557-58.
87 Id. at 558.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id. The court cited the Eighth Circuit case Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc., 113
F.3d 832, 835 (8th Cir. 1997), which "not[ed] that terms such as 'I agree,' 'I accept,' and
'condition of employment' distinguish legally significant communications from non-
binding policies by imparting to an employee that the communication constitutes an
enforceable contract." Id.
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"[T]he request to read certain materials did little to provide notice of a waiver
of the right to access a judicial forum because the accompanying description
of those materials failed to convey their legal significance." 91
The court highlighted that the lack of notice could "easily have been
remedied," and listed several ways that General Dynamics could have "set
this particular communication apart from the crowd." 92 The company could
have required a response to the email, but instead they "opted for a 'no
response required' format."'93 Because the company had a history of dealing
with personnel matters by signed documents, the choice of an email
"disguised the import of the communication." 94 The court observed that
"[s]igning an acknowledgment or, in a more modem context, clicking a box
on a computer screen, are acts associated with entering into contracts," and
that "[r]equiring an affirmative response of that sort would have signaled that
the Policy was contractual in nature." 95 The court concluded that "the lack of
that level of inexpensively obtainable formality made it less likely that the
communication would spark a realization that the new Policy marshaled
binding effects." 96
The court was quite harsh in its assessment of the email from General
Dynamics:
To be blunt, the e-mail announcement undersold the significance of the
Policy and omitted the critical fact that it contained a mandatory arbitration
agreement. The result was that a reasonable employee could read the e-mail
announcement and conclude that the Policy presented an optional
alternative to litigation rather than a mandatory replacement for it... [W]e
conclude that it failed to put the recipient on inquiry notice of the unilateral
contract offer contained in the linked materials.97
Thus the appellate court affirmed the lower court's finding that "sending
a mass e-mail message, without more, fails to constitute the minimal level of
notice required by the First Circuit under Rosenberg and other decisions." 98
91 Campbell, 407 F.3d at 558.
9 2 Id. at 556.
93 Id. at 557.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 558.
98 Campbell v. Gen. Dynamics Gov't Sys. Corp., 321 F. Supp. 2d 142, 149 (D.
Mass. 2004).
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D. The Handbook
Unlike the district court, the appellate court spent time addressing the
handbook which was linked on the email, calling it "a final circumstance
under which the communication might have conveyed sufficient notice." 99
Noting that "[p]ersonnel handbooks do not have uniform legal significance,"
the court cited three Massachusetts cases showing that an employee
handbook may or may not be enforceable as a contract. 1°° Whether the
handbook provided notice depended on whether "a reasonable employee of
General Dynamics would have known, given prior dealings between the
company and its work force, that personnel handbooks operated as the
functional equivalents of contracts," in which case "the introduction of a new
policy and the fact of its promulgation in a reissued handbook might have
sufficed to alert such an employee that the handbook contained legally
binding terms."101 In this case, there was no evidence of any such use of
personnel handbooks at General Dynamics to suggest that this particular
handbook was a binding contract. 10 2 Thus the court concluded that "the
company's promulgation of a new handbook, without more, does not support
a finding of adequate notice." 10 3
E. The Use of Email Generally in Forming Agreements
. The appellate court disagreed with the district court concerning email as
an appropriate medium for forming an arbitration agreement: "[T]he district
99 Campbell, 407 F.3d at 558.
100 Id. at 558-59. See O'Brien v. New Eng. Tel. & Tel. Co., 664 N.E.2d 843, 847-
49 (Mass. 1996) (handbook met the requirements for the formation of a contract); Weber
v. Cmty. Teamwork, Inc., 752 N.E.2d 700, 714 (Mass. 2001) (handbook not enforceable
as contract); Jackson v. Action for Boston Cmty. Dev., 525 N.E.2d 411, 415 (Mass.
1988) (handbook not enforceable as contract); see also Margaret M. Pinkham & Emanuel
Alves, Employment Law Decisions: A First Look at the Massachusetts Equal Pay Act,
and a Second Look at Employee Handbooks as Contracts, BOSTON B.J., Jan./Feb. 1997,
at 10, 11 (discussing the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's expansion of
circumstances under which such employment handbooks or manuals might create
enforceable contractual obligations).
101 Campbell, 407 F.3d at 559.
102 Id.
103 Id. For a similar case involving email and a policy manual in which notice was
found, see Highstone v. Westin Eng'g, Inc., 187 F.3d 548, 553 (6th Cir. 1999) (company
provided reasonable notice by sending two emails notifying employees of changes to the
policy manual and publishing the manual on-line).
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court's opinion does exhibit a high degree of skepticism about the use of e-
mail in this context. We do not share that skepticism: we easily can envision
circumstances in which a straightforward e-mail, explicitly delineating an
arbitration agreement, would be appropriate."' 1 4 The appellate court put the
lower court's ruling in the context of "enumerating several ways in which
General Dynamics readily and inexpensively could have made this particular
e-mail notice more informative."' 10 5 The court added, "The district court
sharply discounted General Dynamics's case based on its use of this
particular medium [that is, a mass email]. We question the extent of that
discount."' 06
The appellate court also answered the question the lower court left open,
regarding whether an electronic communication can constitute a written
agreement under the FAA. 10 7 The appellate court referred to The Electronic
Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act (the E-SIGN Act), 10 8
which provides that "with respect to any transaction in or affecting interstate
or foreign commerce," a "signature, contract, or other record relating to such
transaction may not be denied legal effect, validity, or enforceability solely
because it is in electronic form."'1 9 The court stated that the E-SIGN Act
"likely precludes any flat rule that a contract to arbitrate is unenforceable
under the ADA solely because its promulgator chose to use e-mail as the
medium to effectuate the agreement." 1 0 According to the appellate court:
This statute definitively resolves the issue.., as to whether an e-mail
agreement to arbitrate is unenforceable under the FAA because it does not
satisfy the FAA's 'written provision' requirement... By its plain terms, the
104 Campbell, 407 F.3d at 555-56.
105 Id. at 555.
106 Id.; see Campbell v. Gen. Dynamics Gov't Sys. Corp., 321 F. Supp. 2d 142,
148-49 (D. Mass. 2004).
107 Campbell, 407 F.3d at 556; see Campbell, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 150.
108 The Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act (E-SIGN Act),
Pub. L. No. 106-229, 114 Stat. 464 (2000) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7001-31). The E-
SIGN Act is available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2O01/O6/esign7.htm (last visited Feb. 21,
2006). See generally Steven Domanowski, Comment, E-SIGN: Paperless Transactions in
the New Millennium, 51 DEPAUL L. REv. 619, 645 (2001) ("The general rule established
by E-SIGN is that a contract, signature, or other record related to any transaction in or
affecting interstate or foreign commerce may not be denied legal effect, validity, or
enforceability solely because it is in electronic form."); Michael J. Hays, Note, The E-
SIGN Act of 2000: The Triumph of Function over Form in American Contract Law, 76
NOTRE DAMEL. REv. 1183 (2001).
109 Campbell, 407 F.3d at 556 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 7001(a)).
110Id.
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E-Sign Act prohibits any interpretation of the FAA's 'written provision'
requirement that would preclude giving legal effect to an agreement solely
on the basis that it was in electronic form. 1 11
IV. CONCLUSION-WHAT COMPANIES SHOULD Do Now
Companies have reasons and financial incentives to create mandatory
arbitration agreements. 112 However, if they wish to communicate such
important information to employees by email, they should ensure that
adequate measures are taken so that employees are made aware of the
importance of the content of the email. The Campbell court cautioned that its
holding "should not be read as a general denunciation of e-mail as a medium
for contract formation in the workplace."11 3 But under Campbell, merely
sending a mass email, without more, probably fails to meet the minimal level
of notice required. A company wishing to make a new policy known to its
employees will need to go beyond the means chosen by General Dynamics,
taking more positive steps to ensure notice. 114 An email that is intended to be
111 Id. (internal citation omitted). The court cited Specht v. Netscape
Communications Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 26 n. 11 (2d Cir. 2002). Surprisingly few cases have
addressed the E-SIGN Act. Excluding Campbell and Specht, at the time of this writing,
only two other cases have addressed the E-SIGN act: Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v.
Prusky, No. 04-CV-462, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14778 (E.D. Pa. 2005), and In re
Cafeteria Operators, L.P., 299 B.R. 411 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2003).
112 See, e.g., DAVID KEHRER, Tactic 175-Write Arbitration Clauses into Your
Company's Contracts, in SAVE YOUR BUSINESS A BUNDLE: 202 WAYS TO CUT COSTS AND
BOOST PROFITS Now-FOR COMPANIES OF ANY SIzE 270 (1994); see also Barton A.
Bixenstine, Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Claims, in THE BEST OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAw 7.1 (Carl F. Muller ed., 2002) (giving historical overview of
employers using mandatory arbitration for employment claims, and the Supreme Court's
increasing willingness to endorse this approach).
113 Campbell, 407 F.3d at 555.
114 See, e.g., Caley v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 333 F. Supp. 2d 1367 (N.D. Ga.
2004). The company mailed to all of the workers in one facility a copy of the dispute
resolution policy, an explanatory cover letter, and a question and answer form (mailed by
an outside company with first-class postage). Id. at 1371-72. The company also placed
the policy and accompanying information on the company intranet, and distributed the
policy electronically through a newsletter that was emailed to all the employees. Id. at
1372. Finally, the company posted notices relating to the implementation of the policy
(but not the policy itself) on several bulletin boards throughout the company facility. Id.
The court held that the policy was an enforceable agreement to arbitrate under state law,
and that mandatory arbitration of the specific claims brought by plaintiffs did not offend
federal policy under the FAA. Id. at 1377-78. The defendant company's motions to
compel arbitration and their motions to dismiss were granted. Id. at 1379.
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a binding contract should be explicit and well-defined in its terms. 115
Companies would be advised to provide some way of assuring that their
employees received notice-for, example, by requiring a signed response. If
Campbell had responded to General Dynamics by affirming his agreement to
the Policy, notice would have been adequate. A company can elicit such a
response using a form that the employee must sign in order to agree to the
contents, 116 or holding a meeting to discuss the new policy where attendance
is taken.117
Other courts that have addressed the general issue of notice of company
policies via email have found electronic distribution of the information to be
sufficient if combined with other means. 118 A company may be able to
115 See, e.g., PFT Roberson, Inc. v. Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc., 420 F.3d 728 (7th
Cir. 2005) (open-ended email did not create binding contract).
116 In a similar case, however, a signed and returned form was not sufficient because
it did not directly mention arbitration. See Carfagno v. ACE, Ltd., Civil No. 04-6184,
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12614 (D.N.J. 2005). Several employees received an email from
the employer's human resources department which announced an online employee guide.
Id. at *3. The email did not mention that employees would be required to agree to
mandatory and binding arbitration. Id. at *5. The email (unlike in Campbell) included a
"Receipt and Agreement" form, but the employees claimed that because the form did not
mention arbitration, they could not be held to have validly agreed to arbitrate. Id. at *32.
The court agreed with the employees and held that the form was not an enforceable
waiver of the employees' right to sue in a judicial forum. Id.
117 This provided sufficient notice for upholding the enforcement of a mandatory
dispute resolution policy against a discrimination claim in Hightower v. GMRI, Inc., 272
F.3d 239, 241 (4th Cir. 2001). The plaintiff attended a meeting announcing the policy and
signed a form that stated, "I have attended a DRP meeting and have received the
information in regards to DRP." Id.
118 See Mannix v. County of Monroe, 348 F.3d 526 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that
reasonable notice was provided concerning a new policy when meetings were held
between department heads and employees in addition to emails being sent containing the
information). In Mannix, a county employee claimed that although he knew of the
posting of new company policies on the computer email system, he had not read them
and therefore did not receive notice. The court found that the material issue was whether
reasonable notice, as opposed to actual notice, was given to the employee. Id. at 536.
Because the revised policies had been posted on an internal database available to all
employees, meetings were held between department heads and employees, and the
policies were sent out on the county's email system, the court concluded that reasonable
notice was provided. Id. The court noted that under the electronic distribution system, in
contrast to the older hard copy distribution of revised policies, no proof of actual receipt
was collected. Id. However, due to the "advancement and ubiquity of electronic corporate
communications," the court would not "return to older practices by imposing a paper
receipt requirement." Id.
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overcome the notice standard merely by making the email more explicit."19
Using hyperlinks to announce a change of policy may be sufficient as long as
other means are provided. 120 And while posting a policy on the company's
intranet alone may not be sufficient, 121 if an intranet posting is combined
119 See Marlar v. Yellow Transp., No. 03-1042-CV-W-HFS, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
26653 (W.D. Mo. 2004). Prior notice of a dispute resolution policy was provided to the
employee by an email which stated that the policy would become a condition of
employment, and that an employee who remained on the employer's payroll would be
assenting to binding arbitration. Id. at *3. The court found that the email provided
reasonable notice to the employee, id. at *9, and that the employee's suit for age
discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination Employment Act fell within the
scope of the dispute resolution process. Id. at *21. The Marlar court distinguished
Campbell:
Here, there was no attempt to hide or shade the DRP by attaching it to a vague
email. Rather, the email announcing the implementation of the DRP clearly
indicated such in the heading of the email. The email continues by alerting the
reader to the effective date of the DRP, as well as many of the covered disputes. The
email then sets out the procedural concerns, and in bold print, states that the DRP
becomes a condition of employment after the effective date.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
120 For an example of a hyperlinked arbitration clause that was upheld as a viable
contract, see Hubbert v. Dell Corp., 835 N.E.2d 113 (111. App. Ct. 2005). A buyer filled
out forms on an Internet website for purchasing a computer. On the website a blue
hyperlink accessed the "Terms and Conditions of Sale," which included an arbitration
clause. The trial court ruled that the arbitration clause never became a part of the contract,
and that nevertheless it was unconscionable and unenforceable. Id. at 117. The appellate
court reversed, holding that the blue hyperlink taking the buyer to the "Terms and
Conditions of Sale" made the clause conspicuous, and that the clause was enforceable. Id.
at 121.
121 In Acher v. Fujitsu Network Communs., Inc., 354 F. Supp. 2d 26 (D. Mass.
2004), an employer circulated the company's arbitration policy to all its employees,
together with an explanatory memorandum, and posted the policy on the company's
intranet. The employer argued that an employee who filed a wrongful termination suit
had received sufficient notice of the arbitration policy. Id. at 36. The magistrate judge
concluded that the employee did not receive notice of the policy, because the employer
provided no evidence (such as a signed acknowledgment) that the employee actually
received the policy and accompanying memorandum, nor any evidence (such as a sign-in
sheet) that the employee attended any meetings at which the policy was discussed. id. at
37. There was also no evidence that the employee learned that the policy could be found
on the employer's intranet, or that he had accessed the policy on the website. Id.
1090
[Vol. 21:3 2006]
CAMPBELL V. GEN. DYMNAMICS
with direct and explicit email notification, that may provide reasonable
notice. 122
After Campbell, companies wishing to enact a new policy would be
advised to communicate with their employees in a more effective and
conspicuous manner than mass email alone. Electronic communication can
still be effective and useful, provided that the company takes steps to assure
notice and assent if a policy announced in the email is expected to be legally
binding. 123
Ian Best
122 See Mannix, 348 F.3d 526 (holding reasonable notice provided when new
policies were posted on an internal database available to all employees, in addition to
emails describing the policy).
123 Footnote 123 is available online, and applies to the entire Recent Development.
The author created an electronic version of Footnote 123 for the sake of keeping this
article continuously updated. The author intends Footnote 123 to be a perpetual resource
for displaying further research on Campbell, its impact, and its progeny. If the URL
should become inactive, this footnote's contents will be in the possession of the author
and will be made available through another online source. The current URL of Footnote
123 is: http://3lepiphany.typepad.com31_epiphany/2006/02/campbell-fn123.html.
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